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The Transformative Use Test Fails to Protect 
Actor-Celebrities’ Rights of Publicity 
By Kevin L. Chin* 
Videogame technology has reached the point where characters can accurately mimic 
real-life individuals’ faces, features, and expressions. This has prompted new issues in 
the conflict between the right of publicity and freedom of expression. While the common-
law right of publicity prevents the use of one’s identity or image without consent, the 
First Amendment limits this doctrine’s reach. Courts agree that the right of publicity 
must be balanced with freedom of expression, but differ on how to do so.  
A few recent cases, however, indicate that the issue may soon be resolved. The Third and 
Ninth Circuit Courts, as well as the State of California, have adopted the “transformative 
use test.” Under this test, unauthorized use of an identity is permissible if the use adds 
significant creative elements and sufficiently transforms the likeness or identity into 
original expression.  Courts have thus far only applied this test to football videogames 
using the likenesses of athletes, and none has found the use of these athletes’ likenesses 
adequately transformative.   
The transformative use test, although useful in some instances, is incomplete. The Third 
and Ninth Circuits have allowed football players to protect their likenesses in the football 
context because football players are primarily known and recognized for one thing—
playing football. Actors, on the other hand, may be famous for playing a wide variety of 
roles. Although some actors are associated with certain characters, many actors assume 
various roles stretching across diverse genres. This makes it more difficult to determine 
which actions and environments are popularly associated with an actor. Videogames 
exacerbate this difficulty because videogames can put characters in any environment, 
performing any action imaginable.  
Because videogame characters can now accurately resemble famous actors, a new 
question has arisen: how to apply the transformative use test to videogames that employ 
celebrity likenesses without consent. This Comment explains how this new situation 
highlights a major flaw in the transformative use test. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Videogame technology has reached the point where characters can accurately mimic 
real-life individuals’ faces, features, and expressions. This has prompted new issues in the 
conflict between the right of publicity and freedom of expression. While the common-law 
right of publicity prevents the use of one’s identity or image without consent, the First 
Amendment limits this doctrine’s reach. Courts agree that the right of publicity must be 
balanced with freedom of expression, but differ on how to do so.  
¶2  A few recent cases, however, indicate that the issue may soon be resolved. The Third 
and Ninth Circuit Courts, as well as the State of California, have adopted the 
“transformative use test.” Under this test, unauthorized use of an identity is permissible if 
the use adds significant creative elements and sufficiently transforms the likeness or 
identity into original expression.1 Courts have thus far only applied this test to football 
videogames using the likenesses of athletes, and none has found the use of these athletes’ 
likenesses adequately transformative.2 The courts reasoned that the digital football players 
were doing the same thing that made the real-life athletes famous: playing football. These 
rulings have taken away a major defense for videogame companies.  
¶3  The transformative use test, although useful in some instances, is incomplete. The 
Third and Ninth Circuits have allowed football players to protect their likenesses in the 
football context because football players are primarily known and recognized for one 
thing—playing football. Actors, on the other hand, may be famous for playing a wide 
 
1 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (2001). 
2 See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 
2013), aff’g Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 2010 WL 530108, *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010); Hart v. Elec. Arts, 
717 F.3d 141, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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variety of roles. Although some actors are associated with certain characters, many actors 
assume various roles stretching across diverse genres. This makes it more difficult to 
determine which actions and environments are popularly associated with an actor. 
Videogames exacerbate this difficulty because videogames can put characters in any 
environment, performing any action imaginable.  
¶4  Because videogame characters can now accurately resemble famous actors, a new 
question has arisen: how to apply the transformative use test to videogames that employ 
celebrity likenesses without consent. This Comment explains how this new situation 
highlights a major flaw in the transformative use test. Part I discusses the origins of the 
right of publicity. Part II compares the transformative use test to other tests and examines 
cases that applied the transformative use test to actors and videogames (but not both). Part 
III illustrates the flaws in the transformative use test through a hypothetical right of 
publicity case involving an actor portrayed in a videogame. Part IV analyzes continuing 
uncertainties and how courts might confront this issue in the future. 
A. History of the Right of Publicity 
¶5  The right of publicity is governed by state law and is typically defined as “the 
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”3 
This right bears some resemblance to trademark, copyright, and privacy rights, but is 
separate and distinct.4 In the seminal case Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc., the court explained: “[A] man has a right in the publicity value of his 
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture . . . . 
[T]his right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’”5  
¶6  Haelan generated conflicting interpretations, leaving the right of publicity doctrine 
murky. William Prosser’s highly influential law review article Privacy narrowly 
interpreted the “right of publicity” as a licensee’s exclusive right to use one’s own name, 
identity, and likeness.6 In contrast, Joseph Grodin promoted a broader interpretation of 
Haelan’s impact on the right of publicity:  
[T]he Haelan case gave protection to persons’ commercial interest in their 
personality independent of their privacy interest. . . . If courts wish to protect 
both interests to at least some extent, they should do so under separate 
doctrines, so that limitations appropriate to each interest may be imposed.7 
¶7  Supporting this broader application, famed scholar Melville Nimmer argued that 
traditional law inadequately protected an individual’s commercial interest in her identity 
due to modern cultural and technological realities.8 Nimmer explained that with many 
technological advances in communication, advertising, and entertainment, “[celebrity] 
 
3 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2005). 
4 J. Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete’s Identity: The Right of Publicity, 
Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 198 (2001). 
5 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
6 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960); MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:26. 
7 Joseph Grodin, Note, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123, 1127, 1130 
(1953). 
8 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204 (1954). 
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likeness [has taken] on a pecuniary value undreamed of at the turn of the century.”9 The 
right of publicity was thus adopted as a means of protecting this financial interest.10 As of 
2015, thirty-one states have recognized the right of publicity through either statute or 
common law.11  
B. Freedom of Expression: Limits to the Right of Publicity  
¶8  The Constitution, however, limits the right of publicity’s reach. Specifically, the right 
must be balanced with First Amendment protection on a case-by-case basis.12 In 1977, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decided Zacchini v. Scripps-Howards Broadcasting Co., its first right 
of publicity case.13 There, the plaintiff was an entertainer known for his human cannonball 
act.14 A freelance reporter captured this fifteen-second act on video, and the local television 
station broadcasted it.15 The plaintiff never gave any permission to distribute the video.16 
The news station raised freedom of expression as a defense, claiming that the First 
Amendment protected the broadcast.17 However, the Court held that the freedom of 
expression defense was restricted in this case where a news station reproduced an entire 
act, because the performer had a right to be compensated for his performance.18 Although 
Zacchini’s holding was limited in that it applied only to performers’ rights in videos 
depicting entire commercial acts, for the first time a right of publicity claim trumped First 
Amendment protection.19 
II. MODERN BALANCING TESTS 
¶9  Since Zacchini, states have created various tests that balance freedom of expression 
with state right-of-publicity laws. While this Comment analyzes the transformative use 
test, the “Rogers test” and the “predominant use test” provide alternative approaches to 
balancing the First Amendment with the right of publicity. 
A. The Rogers Test 
¶10  In Rogers v. Grimaldi, famed actress Ginger Rogers sued the producers of the film 
“Ginger and Fred” for using her identity without permission.20 The film, directed by 
Frederico Fellini, portrays a fictional pair of Italian cabaret dancers who model their act 
after the famous dancing duo Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire. Though named Pippo and 
 
9 Id. 
10 See id. at 222–23. 
11 Twenty-one states expressly recognize the right of publicity in common law. Ten states have statutes 
that embody most aspects of the right of publicity. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 6:3. 
12 See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 8:23. 
13 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 
8:24. 
14 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563. 
15 Id. at 563–64. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 575–76. 
19 See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 8:27. 
20 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996–97 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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Amelia, the film depicts the two as being popularly known in Italy as Ginger and Fred.21 
Many years later, the Italian dancers emerge from retirement for a televised reunion.22 
¶11  The Rogers test aims to prevent consumer confusion.23 The first step of the Rogers 
test is to determine whether the use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness is at least minimally 
relevant to the underlying work.24 If not, then the First Amendment does not protect the 
work, and the defense fails.25 If it is at least minimally relevant, the court determines 
whether the work is simply a disguised advertisement.26 If so, then the First Amendment 
does not protect the work.27 In sum, under the Rogers test, the use of an individual’s name 
is prohibited if either the plaintiff’s name is not minimally relevant to the underlying work, 
or the use is “simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or 
services.”28   
¶12  The Rogers court held that the title—“Ginger and Fred”—was clearly relevant to the 
movie because the character names—“Ginger” and “Fred”—were selected to add 
significance to the story.29 And because the movie was not a disguised advertisement, the 
court held the use of the performers’ names in the title did not violate the right of publicity 
under Oregon law.30 
B. The Predominant Use Test 
¶13  In Doe v. TCI Cablevision, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the “predominant 
use test” to analyze competing First Amendment and right of publicity interests.31 In Doe, 
former professional hockey player Tony Twist challenged a character from the Spawn 
comic book that he believed was modeled after him.32 The comic featured a fictional 
character named “Anthony Twistelli,” referred to as “Tony Twist,” who was an evil Mafia 
Don.33 The real-life Twist had a reputation as one of hockey’s toughest players, but bore 
no physical similarity to the comic character.34  
¶14  The Missouri Supreme Court chose not to adopt the transformative use test largely 
because it seemed to overextend First Amendment protection.35 The court criticized the 
transformative use test, stating that a commercial work could receive First Amendment 
protection if a court could find any amount of personal expression in it, regardless of the 
commercial exploitation.36 The court explained that if a product is primarily exploiting the 
commercial value of an individual’s identity, “that product should be held to violate the 
 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 997. 
23 Id. at 999.  
24 Id. 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 1004. 
29 Id. at 1001. 
30 Id. at 1004–05. 
31 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 8:72. 
32 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 365 (Mo. 2003). 
33 Id. at 366. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 375. 
36 Id. 
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right of publicity and not be protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some 
‘expressive’ content in it that might qualify as ‘speech’ in other circumstances.”37 
However, the court acknowledged that if “the predominant purpose of the product is to 
make an expressive comment on or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given 
greater weight.”38 
¶15  Unable to find a legitimate literary reason for the similarities, the court held that the 
predominant use of the retired hockey player’s name was to attract attention to the 
defendant’s commercial product.39 Thus, the court rejected the free speech defense since 
the use of the plaintiff’s name was primarily commercial and not expressive.40 
C. The Transformative Use Test 
¶16  In 2001, the California Supreme Court created the transformative use test by 
borrowing from the fair use doctrine in copyright law.41 In Comedy III Products, Inc. v. 
Gary Saderup, Inc., Gary Saderup had created charcoal drawings of the Three Stooges and 
sold the drawings as lithograph prints and tee shirts without permission.42 The actors’ 
estates sued Saderup, claiming the sale of the prints and tee shirts violated their rights of 
publicity.43 The court held that because the artworks were literal depictions of the Three 
Stooges, the works were not sufficiently “transformative” to afford First Amendment 
protection.44 The court stated that the transformative use test asks whether the piece “adds 
significant creative elements so as to be transformed into something more than a mere 
celebrity likeness or imitation.”45 In other words, a product is “transformative,” and thus 
protected by the First Amendment, if it is “so transformed that it has become primarily the 
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”46 
¶17   The court noted that uses such as parody are acceptable because they do not directly 
challenge the celebrity’s economic interests.47 Parodies of a celebrity’s image, for example, 
are “not good substitutes for conventional depictions of the celebrity and therefore do not 
generally threaten markets for celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity is designed 
to protect.”48 Further, the transformative use test allows various expressions other than 
parody.49 The court explained that the transformative elements protected by the First 
Amendment “are not confined to parody and can take many forms, from factual reporting 
to fictionalized portrayal, from heavy-handed lampooning to subtle social criticism.”50 
Ultimately, the court concluded that any balancing test must recognize that a celebrity 
cannot restrict all uses of her likeness or image, and that the “right to comment on, parody, 
 
37 Id. at 374. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 372. 
40 Id. 
41 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807–08 (2001).  
42 Id. at 393. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 409. 
45 Id. at 391. 
46 Id. at 406. 
47 See id. at 405. 
48 Id. 
49 See id. 
50 Id. at 406. 
Vol. 13:2] Kevin L. Chin 
 203 
lampoon, and make other expressive uses of the celebrity image must be given broad 
scope.”51  
¶18  California recognizes the right of publicity under both state statute and common 
law.52 A common-law claim requires the plaintiff to show: “(1) the defendant’s use of the 
plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s 
advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.”53 A 
statutory claim requires proof of the previous four elements, plus two more: defendant’s 
(5) “knowing use of the plaintiff’s identity” and (6) “a direct connection between the 
alleged use and the commercial purpose.”54 
¶19  In 2003, the California Supreme Court applied the transformative use test to a new 
medium—a comic book.55 In Winter v. DC Comics, Johnny and Edgar Winter, two rock 
musicians with distinctive, long, white hair and pale skin, sued DC Comics for allegedly 
infringing their rights of publicity.56 In one of its comic books, DC Comics included two 
characters that were villainous, half-worm, half-human brothers named Johnny and Edgar 
Autumn.57 The plaintiffs claimed the comic book’s Autumn brothers had the distinctive, 
long, white hair and pale skin similar to the real-life Winter brothers.58 The court decided 
that the cartoonish portrayal of the Winter brothers was so wildly twisted that it was 
transformative and thus afforded First Amendment protection.59 The court also clarified 
that the transformative use test focuses on whether the use is transformative, not whether 
the use falls neatly into a category such as parody or satire.60  
¶20  These cases helped shape the contours of the transformative use test and define the 
boundary between the right of publicity and freedom of expression. In many cases, 
determining whether a work is transformative seems straightforward.61 Specifically, when 
the activities of the depicted character and the setting of the allegedly infringing work 
substantially differ from their real-world counterpart’s activities and related setting, its 
 
51 Id. at 403. 
52 The terminology for right of publicity claims varies across states. In this Comment, the right of 
publicity refers to this right as a subset of the more encompassing right to privacy. Though the right of 
publicity technically falls within the contours of privacy law, it “may be regarded as the reverse side of the 
coin of privacy.” MELVIN B. NIMMER, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293 (1954), 
reprinted in NIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF 
ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETITION, DEFAMATION, PRIVACY 1249 (8th ed., 
2012). 
53 Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2009).  
54 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344. 
55 Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003). 
56 Id. at 476. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 479. 
60 Id. (“It does not matter what precise literary category the work falls into. What matters is whether the 
work is transformative, not whether it is parody or satire or caricature or serious social commentary or any 
other specific form of expression.”).  
61 For instance, in Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, Paris Hilton sued Hallmark Cards for creating a birthday 
card that used her identity. 599 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2010). Titled “Paris’s First Day as a Waitress,” the 
birthday card superimposed Paris Hilton’s face on a cartoon waitress’s body saying “that’s hot,” her 
famous catch phrase. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the use was not sufficiently transformative because the 
card showed Paris Hilton as a person “born to privilege,” a setting in which she is often associated. Id. at 
911. This case illustrates how the activity and setting of the individual’s identity in the work is a significant 
factor when applying the transformative use test. 
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transformative nature likely affords the work First Amendment protection. But when a 
plaintiff’s public identity potentially encompasses a broad range of activities and settings, 
the transformative use test becomes less suitable. Indeed, devising an adequately 
transformative portrayal of someone who is famously recognized for myriad non-distinct 
roles poses various difficulties under this test.  
D. Transformative Use Test Applied to Videogames 
¶21  In 2006, California applied the transformative use test to videogames in Kirby v. Sega 
of America, Inc.62 Keirin Kirby, who had gained fame in the early 1990s as the lead singer 
of a dance-musical group, sued a videogame producer for a character named “Ulala,” 
whose dress-style, distinctive bright hair, and catchphrases were allegedly similar to hers.63 
Set in the 25th century during an alien invasion,64 the videogame depicts a news reporter 
named Ulala who must mimic certain dance moves.65 The court held that although there 
were similarities between the plaintiff and the character, there were enough differences to 
be transformative.66 The court pointed to the futuristic setting and differences in Ulala’s 
appearance and dance moves.67 Since the activity and setting of the digital look-alike 
differed from the activity and setting of the real-life individual, the digital character 
constituted a transformative use of the real-life individual’s image. In sum, Kirby further 
establishes that the activity and setting of the work play a significant role when applying 
the transformative use test. 
1. No Doubt: Musicians in Videogames 
¶22  As technology continues to develop, videogames become better at accurately 
mimicking real-life people. In turn, these realistic portrayals have increased the prevalence 
of right of publicity claims stemming from videogames. In No Doubt v. Activision 
Publishing, Inc., the defendant created the game Band Hero, which allows players to 
simulate playing in a band to the timing of select songs.68 In the videogame, a player 
chooses a song and an “avatar,”69 which performs on stage in sync with the music.70 While 
some avatars were fictional, the game included members of the band “No Doubt.”71 No 
Doubt agreed to license three songs72 and allowed the game to use their likenesses, as long 
as these avatars only performed No Doubt songs.73 But No Doubt later discovered that 
Band Hero had an “unlocking” feature, allowing players to use the No Doubt avatars for 
 
62 Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (2006). 
63 Id. at 52. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 59–60. 
67 See id. 
68 No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1022–24 (2011).  
69 Id. at 1023. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
72 Though No Doubt agreed to license three songs, it ultimately only licensed two. Id. at 1024. 
73 Id. 
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any song on Band Hero.74 No Doubt claimed they neither consented to nor were they 
compensated for these additional uses.75 
¶23  The court held that Activision’s use of the No Doubt avatars was not sufficiently 
transformative because the avatars played rock music in a concert setting, which is exactly 
what made No Doubt famous.76 While the avatars could sing non-No Doubt songs and 
players could select fanciful venues, this “[did] not transform the avatars into anything 
other than exact depictions of No Doubt’s members doing exactly what they do as 
celebrities.”77 Thus, No Doubt reinforces the rule that differences in actions and context 
are vitally important in determining whether a use is transformative. 
2. Keller v. Electronic Arts: Sports Videogames 
¶24  In a class-action lawsuit—In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litigation (Keller)—college athletes sued Electronic Arts (EA) for violating their rights of 
publicity.78 EA’s videogame series NCAA Football allowed players to select football teams 
and play simulated games.79 Every character in the game represented an actual college-
football player, and EA tried to model the avatars as closely as possible to the real-world 
athletes.80 One of those athletes was the plaintiff Samuel Keller, a former quarterback at 
Arizona State University and the University of Nebraska.81    
¶25  The court held the avatars were not transformative.82 The court pointed to the various 
similarities between the avatars and real-life players, such as height, weight, skin tone, hair 
color, team, and jersey number.83 Further, the context of the game mirrored the context that 
made the athletes famous—college football.84 
E. Hope for Agreement: Hart v. Electronic Arts 
¶26  In 2013, the circuit courts appeared to move toward agreement. The Third Circuit 
applied the transformative use test in Hart v. Electronic Arts, a case with facts virtually 
identical to those in Keller.85 EA released a new version of its NCAA Football series, 
which, like the version challenged in Keller, used the likenesses of NCAA football 
players.86 These avatars included Ryan Hart, a quarterback at Rutgers University87 who 





76 Id. at 1034–35. 
77 Id. at 1034. 
78 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’g 
Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 2010 WL 530108, *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
79 Id. at 1271. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1276–77. 
83 Id. at 1272. 
84 Id. at 1276–77. 
85 Hart v. Elec. Arts, 717 F.3d 141, 165 (3d Cir. 2013).  
86 Id. at 146. 
87 Id. at 145. 
88 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (D.N.J. 2011). 
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¶27  New Jersey had not yet established a First Amendment balancing test, leaving the 
Third Circuit with discretion to create its own.89 The court considered using the 
predominant use test, the Rogers test, and the transformative use test.90 First, the court 
rejected the Rogers test fearing it would “immunize a broad swath of tortious activity.”91 
Hart, as a football player, was not “wholly unrelated” to the work, which would negate his 
right of publicity claims under the Rogers test.92 The court feared this high bar to right of 
publicity claims would create perverse results, preventing nearly all of such claims.93 After 
all, the primary reason to use a football player’s identity is to profit off his fame in the 
football context, and the Rogers test would immunize this use.94 The court also rejected 
the predominant use test, fearing it would require judges to place value on discrete portions 
of a work and compare them to the expressiveness as a whole.95 This would be “subjective 
at best, arbitrary at worst, and in either case call[] upon judges to act as both impartial 
jurists and discerning art critics.”96 The court ultimately applied the transformative use test, 
holding that EA’s use of Hart’s identity in the football context did not create additional 
significant expression for it to be considered sufficiently transformative.97  
¶28  The defendant argued that the use of Hart’s likeness was transformative because, 
unlike in No Doubt, videogame users had the option to alter the avatars’ features, such as 
hair and skin colors.98 However, the court determined these modifications were too 
minimal to transform Hart’s likeness sufficiently.99 EA also claimed that the game was 
transformative as a whole,100 but the court found this approach improper, stating that the 
only relevant question pertained to how the celebrity’s identity was used, not the work’s 
overall transformative nature.101  
¶29  But the court was not without its doubts. For instance, the court acknowledged this 
could open the door to many forms of abuse, stating, “[T]his concern is particularly acute 
in the case of media that lend themselves to easy partition such as video games.”102 Further, 
writing in dissent, Judge Thomas Ambro took a broader view of the transformative use 
test,103 arguing that the entire game, including the graphics, sound effects, and game 
scenarios, was transformative enough to warrant First Amendment protection.104 
 
89 Id. at 165. 
90 Id. at 153. 
91 Id. at 157. 
92 Id. (explaining that, under the Rogers test, Hart would be “unable to assert a claim for appropriating 
his likeness as a football player precisely because his likeness was used for a game about football”). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 154. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 166. 
98 Id. at 168–69. 
99 Id. at 168. 
100 Id. at 169. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 174–75. 
104 Id. 
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III. TRANSFORMATIVE USE TEST APPLIED TO ACTORS  
¶30  As videogame producers become increasingly adept at replicating human features 
and movement, the growing number of rights of publicity violations is unlikely to abate. 
The cases discussed supra Part II involved musicians and athletes, but what about actors? 
Musicians are generally associated with specific songs or sounds. Athletes are usually 
recognized for a single sport or team. But actors are not limited to distinct roles. The 
importance of context in the transformative use test suggests that courts may encounter 
new problems when applying the test to characters modeled after actors.  
A. Example 1: “Ellie” in The Last of Us 
¶31  In 2013, Naughty Dog, a videogame developer, released The Last of Us,105 which 
depicts a 14-year-old girl named “Ellie” living in a post-apocalyptic world.106 After 
reviewing this “third-person-shooter” videogame, some commentators noted that the face 
and voice of Ellie looked and sounded similar to that of Ellen Page, a real-life actress.107 
In response, Naughty Dog preemptively revised these problematic features,108 curtailing 
any potential legal controversy. Nevertheless, this scenario illustrates how the 
transformative use test, despite prior applications to musicians and athletes, does not 
adequately address a situation involving the unauthorized use of an actor’s likeness in a 
videogame.  
¶32  When applying the transformative use test, courts first determine the celebrity’s 
identity, and then compare it with the defendant’s use of that identity to decide whether the 
defendant has sufficiently transformed the identity to create an original expression. This 
process is simple for musicians and athletes: musicians gain recognition for playing music 
in a certain stage setting and athletes gain recognition for performing sports in a certain 
athletic setting. With musicians and athletes, a court can use these recognized actions and 
settings as a baseline from which a defendant may or may not have sufficiently transformed 
the celebrity’s identity to afford First Amendment protection. Actors and actresses, 
however, play a variety of roles in virtually any setting. Determining an actor’s identity 
presents many challenges, making the transformative use test more difficult in this context. 
Returning to The Last of Us as an example, the next section assumes that the game 
developer used the actress–celebrity’s likeness in its videogame without consent. 
 
105 The Last of Us, IGN.COM, http://www.ign.com/games/the-last-of-us/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). 
106 The Last of Us, THELASTOFUS.COM, http://www.thelastofus.playstation.com/characters.html (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2014). 
107 Tamoor Hussain, The Last of Us Gets Enslaved Lead Designer, Doesn’t Star Ellen Page, 
COMPUTERANDVIDEOGAMES.COM (Dec. 12, 2011, 2:24 PM), 
http://www.computerandvideogames.com/329270/the-last-of-us-gets-enslaved-lead-designer-doesnt-star-
ellen-page/. 
108 “The Last of Us” Developer Calls Ellen Page-Likeness Reaction “Overblown,” EXAMINER (June 25, 
2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/the-last-of-us-developer-calls-ellen-page-likeness-reaction-
overblown. 
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1. Transformative Use Test Applied to “Ellie”109 
¶33  In the case of “Ellie,” it is unclear what the Third Circuit would hold after Hart. But 
the manner in which courts usually apply the transformative use test suggests that a court 
would first focus on whether Naughty Dog used Ellen Page’s identity. When applying the 
transformative use test, the court must identify the celebrity’s identity, including the 
associated actions and settings, and compare those to the defendant’s use. Therefore, before 
adequately comparing the fictional Ellie with the real-life Ellen Page, the court must 
determine which recognizable actions or features make Ellen Page famous.  
¶34  Ellen Page is famous for multiple audio-visual works, including movies such as Juno, 
released in 2007, and Inception, released in 2010.110 Although some actors have certain 
mannerisms, humor, or other features causing them to be cast as certain character types, 
many actors play a wide variety of roles. Thus, the results of the transformative use test in 
this scenario depend on the court’s interpretation of (1) what actions and settings are 
associated with the actor, and (2) the actions and setting of the digital look-alike. 
¶35  A preliminary issue is whether the similar facial features between fictional Ellie and 
actress Ellen Page indicate the use of Page’s likeness. Besides facial features and voice, 
the similarities between Ellen Page and Ellie are minimal. Ellen Page was not involved in 
the production of the videogame, and Ellie was voiced and otherwise “played” by voice-
actress Ashley Johnson.111 The game never overtly references Ellen Page, and Naughty 
Dog has not represented or implied that Ellen Page is connected to the game.112 Still, the 
facial and vocal similarities were enough to stir public commentary. If a court were to find 
that the character Ellie copied Ellen Page’s likeness, the transformative use test would 
weigh heavily against Naughty Dog. 
¶36  As for actions and setting, Ellie fights infected “zombies” and other survivors in a 
zombie-apocalypse environment. Page has never acted in a zombie film, play, or television 
program, distinguishing this scenario from Hart. However, she has acted in action-thriller 
movies, such as Inception and X-Men: The Last Stand, and most of her fans would likely 
be unsurprised to find Ellen Page in a zombie movie or videogame. While it is perfectly 
plausible that Ellen Page could be a character in The Last of Us, nothing about the setting 
specifically points to Page, illustrating the difficulty of applying the transformative use test 
to actors. Ultimately, the decision would likely depend on whether the court initially found 
that Naughty Dog used Ellen Page’s likeness. 
2. Predominant Use Test Applied to “Ellie” 
¶37  Under the predominant use test, a court finding infringement is doubtful. Unlike the 
use of a famous hockey player’s name in Doe v. TCI Cablevision, there is little evidence 
that Naughty Dog primarily employed the similar facial features to garner a commercial 
 
109 This Comment assumes that Naughty Dog did not change the appearance of the “Ellie” character, 
and thus her appearance is still similar to actress Ellen Page. 
110 Ellen Page, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0680983/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). 
111 Danny Gallagher, E3 2012: The Last of Us Doesn’t Want You to Think Ellen Page Is Ellie, 
Announces Changes, GAME TRAILERS (June 8, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://www.gametrailers.com/side-
mission/16989/e3-2012-the-last-of-us-doesnt-want-you-to-think-ellen-page-is-ellie-announces-changes. 
112 David McLaughlin, Using Images in Video Games: Potential Issues, LAWAPART.COM (July 1, 2013), 
http://lawapart.com/posts/video-games/using-images-video-games-potential-issues. 
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advantage. In fact, the resemblance appears unintentional.113 Thus, courts relying upon the 
predominant use test would likely dismiss any right of publicity claims in this scenario. 
3. The Rogers Test Applied to “Ellie” 
¶38  Under the Rogers test, Ellie’s resemblance to Page could arguably meet the low 
threshold that asks whether the use is minimally relevant to the work. One could argue the 
face is an essential artistic element to the character’s expression and recognition. Perhaps, 
Page’s celebrity identity evinces characteristics that are emblematic of the videogame 
creator’s intended artistic expression. But at the same time, the storyline did not depend on 
the person’s similarity to any particular actor. Naughty Dog could have used someone 
else’s face for Ellie to the same effect; in fact, Naughty Dog did ultimately revise the face 
before the game’s public release.114 Ultimately, a court might deem the use relevant 
because the test only requires that “the level of relevance merely must be above zero.”115 
¶39  The next step considers whether the use is merely a disguised advertisement. 
Individuals might purchase a zombie-survival game because of its association with a 
famous actress. Further, Naughty Dog changed Ellie’s similar features, suggesting there 
was some confusion about Ellen Page’s involvement in the game. But while directly 
applying the Rogers test prompts certain questions, First Amendment protection likely 
extends in this context because, looking to precedent, applying the Rogers test here is likely 
inappropriate. In the first place, courts often limit the Rogers test only to instances 
involving titles of works.116 Moreover, the Rogers test derives from trademark law,117 
which the Third Circuit explained would “turn the right of publicity on its head” in the 
videogame context.118 Unlike the right of publicity, which is akin to a property right, 
trademark law aims to prevent consumer confusion.119 Because of this shifted focus, the 
Rogers test in many ways ignores the magnitude of misappropriation in a work. In fact, the 
Rogers test would penalize celebrities by not allowing them to protect their identities in 
works that most effectively exploit their public renown for commercial gain. For instance, 
in Hart, the court rejected the Rogers test because a plaintiff would be “unable to assert a 
claim for appropriating his likeness as a football player precisely because his likeness was 
used for a game about football.”120 Thus, as long as a videogame producer refrains from 
using a specific character to market the videogame to consumers, any right of publicity 
claim will be dismissed by the Rogers test if the misappropriation occurs in a videogame 
 
113 Gallagher, supra note 111. 
114 Id. 
115 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding use 
of trademark of a business in a videogame is exempt from liability under the Rogers balancing test). 
116 See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 157 (3d Cir. 2013); Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 
542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008). But see ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
117 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
118 Hart, 717 F.3d at 157 (rejecting the Rogers test because a plaintiff would be “unable to assert a claim 
for appropriating his likeness as a football player precisely because his likeness was used for a game about 
football. Adopting this line of reasoning threatens to turn the right of publicity on its head”) 
119 See J. Schiffres, Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintiff’s Name or Likeness in 
Advertising, 23 A.L.R. 3d 865 (1969) (discussing how the “publicity tort seeks to protect property interest 
that celebrity has in his or her name”). 
120 Id. 
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that is related to the celebrity’s source of fame. In short, beyond instances involving the 
use of a celebrity’s name in a videogame title, the Rogers test likely fails to provide a 
reasonable solution.  
B. Example 2: Jodie in Beyond: Two Souls 
¶40  In 2013, game developer Quantic Dream released Beyond: Two Souls, an action-
adventure videogame.121 The main character is “Jodie Holmes,” who has been raised and 
studied by researchers because of her connection with a supernatural entity named 
“Aiden.”122 In the game, the user controls Jodie through different chapters of her life, 
including childhood interactions and assassination missions in service to the military.123 
The player can also control, to a limited extent, the Aiden character.124 
¶41  Quantic Dream developed the videogame with the help of two established actors. 
Quantic Dream modeled Jodie Holmes’s appearance and movement after actress Ellen 
Page, who also voiced the character.125 Nathan Dawkins, a researcher and Jodie’s surrogate 
father, is voiced by and modeled after actor Willem Dafoe.126 The actors fully consented 
to the use of their bodies and voice, which the videogame mimics remarkably. Examining 
how the transformative use test, and others, would apply to both Ellen Page and Willem 
Dafoe in this scenario, wherein the real-life actors and their videogame counterparts appear 
almost entirely identical, leaving no room for doubt as to their connection, highlights 
potential future issues in this ever-evolving technological landscape. For this exercise, 
focusing on Ellen Page specifically, this Comment assumes neither Defoe nor Page 
consented to such use and that Quantic Dream did not overtly advertise any relationship 
with the actors. 
1. Transformative Use Test 
¶42   Although it is unclear what the transformative use test would determine in this 
scenario, it again likely boils down to whether the court would find that the character was 
modeled after Ellen Page. Quantic Dream designed the main character’s facial features and 
body type to resemble Ellen Page. However, the multiple environments in which the 
character finds herself, along with her wildly different actions, differentiate her from any 
role Ellen Page has ever played. Still, Page is an actress who has played many roles across 
many genres, and because the character is identical to Page, similar to No Doubt and Hart, 
a court may find the use not to be sufficiently transformative. After finding use of her 
likeness, the character’s actions and the game’s setting are not so different from Page’s 
roles to pass the transformative use test. 
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2. Predominant Use Test 
¶43   The predominant use test looks at whether the use of the celebrity’s likeness is meant 
to exploit the person’s identity for commercial gain. In contrast, if a work is predominantly 
expressive in that it posits a particular opinion about the celebrity, then First Amendment 
protection more likely applies.127 The court would first need to decide whether Quantic 
Dream used Page’s likeness. The developers could argue that they chose the character’s 
features to reflect youth and innocence, and Page coincidentally shares those same 
characteristics. If the court found that Page’s likeness had been used, the predominant use 
test would mostly likely favor Page. The game does not use the Jodie character as anything 
other than a protagonist. It does not present any opinions about Page or her films. Nothing 
in the game could be considered an expression pertaining to Page in the slightest. Without 
anything to suggest a reason for using Ellen Page’s likeness, the only conclusion is that 
Quantic Dream sought to capitalize on Ellen Page’s fame, which is exactly what the right 
of publicity is meant to prevent. 
3. The Rogers Test 
¶44  Under the Rogers test, a court must first assess whether the use of the plaintiff’s 
image is minimally relevant to the underlying work.128 As discussed supra Part III(A)(3), 
a court will likely consider the use relevant since the test has a very low bar, requiring that 
“the level of relevance merely must be above zero.”129 
¶45  After finding a work is minimally relevant, the court must determine whether the 
work is simply a disguised advertisement.130 Judging whether a videogame character was 
intended to be a disguised advertisement is more difficult than determining the same for 
celebrities’ names in production titles, as was the case in Rogers.131 For instance, this likely 
requires considering the degree to which any marketing materials suggest the celebrity’s 
involvement and whether a reasonable person would ascertain from an advertisement that 
the celebrity endorsed the product. And even assuming that Quantic Dream did not overtly 
advertise the similarities between characters and celebrities, consumers might nevertheless 
believe Ellen Page was involved in the videogame’s production and be more likely to 
purchase the game.132 Again, extending the Rogers test in the videogame context seems 
antithetical to the right of publicity’s underlying purpose. 
 
127 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir.  2012) (citing Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 
S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003)). 
128 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
129 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008). 
130 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. 
131 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996–97 (comparing Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire to the movie characters 
“Italian Ginger and Fred”). See supra Part III(A)(3) for similar analysis.  
132 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 157 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that, under the Rogers test, Hart 
would be “unable to assert a claim for appropriating his likeness as a football player precisely because his 
likeness was used for a game about football”).  
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IV. CRITICISM AND ALTERNATIVES 
¶46  Courts have applied the right of publicity not only to actors, but also to characters 
associated with certain actors.133 For instance, if the actor is “inextricably identified” with 
the character that was used without consent, the Third Circuit has allowed actors to assert 
rights of publicity over such character personas.134  
¶47  The transformative use test can turn on the court’s determination of what an actor-
celebrity has done to gain recognition. For right of publicity purposes, an actor’s claim to 
fame cannot be defined as simply “acting” because that could be both over and under 
inclusive. For example, one could argue that, as an actor, the celebrity can claim any role 
that actors play, even if the celebrity herself has not played the role. On the other hand, 
defining the celebrity as an “actor” could be used to limit the right of publicity to situations 
in which the videogame character itself plays an actor. Such a narrow definition would 
virtually eliminate right of publicity claims in videogames. 
¶48  The transformative use test requires the judge to make decisions concerning the 
artistic value and expressions of artwork. A major criticism of this test is that it creates a 
very subjective, and therefore unpredictable, analysis of artwork. Stated differently, the 
“hallmarks” of the transformative use test are its “[d]ifficulty of application and incertitude 
of result.”135 
¶49  One alternative would be to distinguish the medium used by the defendant, as 
opposed to the content.136 Perhaps, a court could find that art reproductions of celebrity 
images on tee shirts are “commercial speech,” thus granting the celebrity licensing 
rights.137 But this approach poses separate challenges. For instance, while courts could 
impose different standards for videogames, this approach likely complicates things further 
because it would require judges to decide which artwork qualifies for different categories. 
¶50  Although the courts in Doe and Hart ultimately disagreed on the appropriate test, 
their reasoning indicates certain consistencies that are fundamental to any balancing test. 
In Doe, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the transformative use test largely because it 
overextended First Amendment protection.138 The Missouri court’s main criticism of the 
transformative use test was that a commercial work could receive First Amendment 
protection upon the slightest finding of personal expression, even if the work’s sole purpose 
was commercial.139 Both the Doe and Hart courts realized the subjective and complicated 
nature of any test that balances First Amendment protection with the right of publicity. 
¶51  A second and more suitable alternative is to allow a defendant to use the celebrity’s 
identity through a compulsory licensing scheme, which forces the defendant to pay a 
portion of any profits to the celebrity.140 Third-party intervention is necessary in this 
 
133 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 4:69 (“Some actors create a performing persona and are always closely 
linked in the public mind with their stage appearance and mannerisms. In these cases, the unpermitted 
commercial use of such a performing persona is an infringement of the actor’s right of publicity.”). 
134 McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 921 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We hold only that there exists at least a 
triable issue of fact as to whether [plaintiff] McFarland had become so inextricably identified with Spanky 
McFarland that McFarland’s own identity would be invoked by the name Spanky.”). 
135 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 8:72. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003). 
139 Id.  
140 See David Frankly & Adam Kuhn, Owning Oneself in a World of Others: Towards a Paid-for First 
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context because of transaction costs and misaligned interests. First, requiring individuals 
to negotiate the terms of these agreements with individual celebrities would merely 
maintain the status quo. For any solution to be effective, it must account for modern 
realities, namely that the line between commercial exploitation and artistic expression is 
opaque. Second, courts should administer the proper royalty fee because prohibitively 
costly licensing rates would negate these arrangements’ efficacy. Although all involved 
would technically benefit, the disparate bargaining power between the parties would likely 
preclude these relationships from forming in a cost effective manner. Specifically, the 
judge or jury should decide the proportion; perhaps, taking into account how much the 
product relies on the use of the celebrity’s identity or likeness. In Zacchini, the Supreme 
Court emphasized that the plaintiff merely wished to be compensated for his talents; he 
was not attempting to censor speech.141 While this test would still be selective, it would 
also be fair because the judge or jury can adjust the outcome to account for the varying 
degrees of “transformation” of the celebrity identity. As the law currently stands, the 
transformative use test results in a binary outcome. The defendant is either free to use the 
plaintiff’s identity in a product or he is not. 
¶52  However, if the judiciary continues to apply the transformative use test, courts should 
attempt to define the scope of the inquiry focusing on whether a work is truly 
transformative. Indeed, some argue that this inquiry, along with its nebulous contours, is 
what caused the Third and Ninth Circuits to adopt such different stances.142 And these 
circuit courts are not alone. Though later reversed, a district court initially held that EA’s 
use of Hart’s identity in the NCAA Football videogame series was transformative enough 
to afford First Amendment protection.143 Agreeing with the lower court’s determination on 
appeal, Judge Ambro, writing in dissent, believed that EA’s use of Hart’s identity was 
sufficiently transformative because he looked at the videogame as a whole, including the 
graphics, sound effects, and game scenarios.144 Although the Third and the Ninth Circuits 
seem to have settled on narrowing the scope of the inquiry to only the use of the celebrity’s 
identity and the immediate surroundings thereof, alternative interpretations nevertheless 
remain salient, illustrating the need to define the scope of the inquiry. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶53  As exemplified by Hart and Keller, balancing the right of publicity with First 
Amendment rights has frustrated courts and practitioners alike. As videogame technology 
progresses, videogames will continue to test the reach of the transformative use test. Some 
courts were able to agree, such as in Hart, Keller, and No Doubt, barring videogame 
companies from using individuals’ identities in virtually the same settings for which the 
individuals had gained recognition. Moreover, when videogames add extraordinary details, 
such use is more likely to be transformative, as seen in Kirby and Winter.145  
 
Amendment, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 977, 1012 (2014). 
141 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977). 
142 Michael Schoeneberger, Unnecessary Roughness: Reconciling Hart and Keller with a Fair Use 
Standard Befitting the Right of Publicity, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1875, 1916 (2013). 
143 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 770 (D.N.J. 2011). 
144 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2013). 
145 See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 59–60 (2006); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 
473, 479 (Cal. 2003). 
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¶54  However, it is unclear whether the use of celebrity identities in videogames satisfies 
the transformative use test in a manner that also provides adequate First Amendment 
protection. The examples discussed supra highlight the issues stemming from judicial 
overreliance on the setting of or the celebrity’s actions in a videogame to determine right 
of publicity claims. Depending on the character portrayed, an actor’s environment and 
actions may differ wildly between roles. The fact that videogame developers can use an 
actor’s persona in virtually any setting magnifies the transformative use test’s inherent 
flaws—specifically, that judges are in no position to make qualitative decisions on what is, 
in essence, a piece of art. 
¶55  In the unique videogame context, courts must tailor the transformative use test to 
handle the unauthorized use of an actor’s identity or name. Because EA has settled with 
the plaintiffs in Hart and Keller, the transformative use test remains in its current form, 
protecting celebrities’ rights of publicity. Perhaps the best solution lies in splitting profits 
without censoring the speech, allowing judicial discretion for what is quantitatively, not 
qualitatively, fair on a case-by-case basis. 
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